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Statute of Limations-Ignoranceof Cause of Action.
In an action of trespass to recover damages for the unlawful mining of'
coal under plaintiff's land, the equitable rule that the statute of limitations
shall run only from discovery, or a time when discovery might have been
made, should be applied.
As equity is administered in Pennsylvania through the common law
forms of action, the plaintiff should not be turned out of a court of law in
order to be admitted at the equity side of the same court. He may, therefore, in an action of trespass for illegal mining, recover compensation in
the same manner that he would on a bill for account.
In such a case the jury should be instructed that, while the statute of
limitations may be available as against the penal consequences of the
trespass, it is not available as a defence against payment for the coal
actually taken and converted to the use of the defendant. It seems that
even in law the statute of limitations runs against an injury committed
in or to a lower stratum, only from the time of actual discovery, or the
time when discovery was reasonably possible.

Opinion of WILLIAMS, J.: "Mere ignorance will not pre-vent the running of the statute in equity any more than at
law; but there is no reason resting on general principles, why
ignorance that is the result of the defendant's conduct, and not
of the stupidity or negligence of the plaintiff, should not prevent the running of the statute in favor of the wrongdoer. It
seems to be the general doctrine in courts of law that the
plaintiff is bound to know of an invasion of the surface of his
close. The fact that his land is a forest and that the defendant goes into its interior to trespass by the cutting of timber,.
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does not relieve against its operation. What is plainly visible
he must see at his peril, unless by actual fraud his attention is
diverted and his vigilance put to sleep. But ought this rule
to extend to a subterranean trespass? The surface is visible
and accessible. The owner may know of its condition without
trespassing on others and for that reason he is bound to
know. The interior of the earth is invisible and inaccessible
to the owner of the surface unless he is' engaged in mining
operations upon his own land; and then he can reach no part
of his own coal stratum except that which he is actually removing. If an adjoining landowner reaches the plaintiffs coal
through subterranean ways that reach the surface on his own
land and are under his actual control, the vigilance the law
requires of the plaintiff upon the surface is powerless to detect
the invasion by his neighbor of the coal one hundred feet
under the surface.
The case at bar affords an excellent illustration of ignorance
'due to the defendant's conduct and without fault on the part
of the plaintiff.
The defendant was mining its own coal through its own
-shafts or drifts opened on its own lands. In the course of its
operations and for its own convenience it pushed an entry or
passage under the plaintiff's lands and appropriated the coal
removed therefrom. It was bound to know its own lines and
keep within them. If by mistake or for any other reason it
-didinvade the mineral estate of another and remove and appropriate the coal therefrom, good conscience required that it
should disclose the fact and pay for the coal taken. Its failure to do this is in its effects a fraud upon the injured owner,
.and if he has no knowledge of the trespass and no means of
-knowledge, such a fraud, whether it be called constructive or
actual, should protect him from the running of the statute."
'THE OPERATION

OF STATUTES

OF LImITATIONS

IN CASES OF

IGNORANCE OR CONCEALMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTIONS.

There are in the books two cases whose facts are substantially identical with those of the principal case.
The first of these, Hunter v. Gibbons, I H. & N. 459,
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decided in 1856 in the Court of Exchequer, was the case of
an application to be allowed to reply, as an equitable answer
(under § 85, C. L. Procedure Act, 1854) to a plea of the
statute of limitations, in an action for trespass to coal lands, F
that the trespasses were underground, and had been fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff till within six years before
suit. The application was refused, and POLLOCK, C. B., said :
-"
It would be highly mischievous, and would open the door
to a flood of litigation, if we decided that this replication could
be pleaded. No case has decided that fraud is an answer to
every matter that may be set up as a defence. Plaintiff must
go into equity and obtain redress, which that court ought to
give him if his contention here is well founded. Plaintiff complains of a trespass to his land. Defendant answers that the
act was done so long ago that it cannot be called in question
in a court of law. To that plaintiff purposes to reply fraud.
Plaintiff's counsel cited one authority to show that where there
has been a fraud the statute cannot be set up. If that were
so, if a man could reply to a plea of the statute that his debtor
had prevented him from suing by fraud, the equitable replications would be as common as the promises of payment which
people used to prove before Lord Tenterden's Act. .

.

. No

sort of litigation would be likely to be more lasting or expensive than a question whether, fifteen years ago, a man took his
neighbor's coal by mistake or fraud."
ALDERSON, B., added: "The terms of the enactment are
absolute, and there is no provision for the case where a person
is prevented from suing by fraud. Such being the plain meaning of the words, plaintiff now calls upon us to say that notwithstanding the statute a person may maintain an action, if
prevented by fraud from suing. But it is for the legislature,
not for us, to say that. There is no distinction between trespasses underground and upon the surface."
The other case is Ifilliavns v. Pomeroy Coal Co., 37 Ohio
State, 583 (1882). There, the lessee of a coal mine worked
over into the land of an adjoining proprietor, and after taking
out all the coal from the demised premises, surrendered his
lease. The plaintiff, having subsequently purchased the adjoin-
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ing land, in mining thereon, in ignorance of the overworking
of defendant, struck such working, whereby the water from the
abandoned mine overflowed his own. In an action for damages against the former lessee, it was held that he was not
liable as for nuisance, not having been the owner of the land;
and that the plea of the statute was good as to the action for
trespass, the court maintaining that, in the application of
the statute, there is no distinction between trespasses underground and upon the surface, nor whether the cause of action
is known or unknown to the plaintiff within the time limited
by the statute, and further, that the bar to a recovery in an
action for a trespass includes all the consequences resulting
from such trespass. Citing Hunter v. Gibbons (supra).
The present case, although in form an action at law, is
professedly decided upon equitable principles, and does not,
therefore, come within these rulings.
The case of Gibbs v. Guild, 3 Q. B. D. 59(1882), presents a
,similar state of affairs. There it was held that the replication
of concealed fraud and absence of reasonable means of discovery, in an action for money lost by. defendant's representations, was good upon equitable principles; and since the Judicature Act, practically abolishing distinctions between law
and equity, would be admissible in the Court of Appeal.
As a general rule, in equity, where the injured person has.
been kept in ignorance of his right to sue, by affirmative,
fraudulent conduct of the defendant, the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the cause of action has been
discovered or become known, or until it might have been
discovered by a reasonable use of the available means.
This is equally true in the case where the concealment is an
inherent incident of the original wrong-that is to say, where
the wrong complained of is of a fraudulent character, thus
necessarily involving concealment,-and in the case where to
this fraud there are superadded positive acts intended to prevent a discovery.
These propositions are practically unquestioned, and in
many states have been extended by statute to actions at law..
(See Wood on Limitations, p. 362.)
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See also, as illustrative cases, decided under such statutes,
_Tylor v. R. R. Co., 13 Fed. 152; Figns v. O'Bannon (Ill.),
8 N. E. 778; Slhreves v. Leonard (Ia.), 8 N. W. 749; Barlow v. Arnold, 6 Fed. 35 1; Loscit v. Pickett (Kan.), 12 Pac.
822; Tompkins v. Hollister (Mich.), 27 N. W. 651; Bank v.
Perry (Mass.), I I N. E. 81 ; Leavenworth Co. v. Ry. Co., 18
Fed. 209 ; Riper v. Howard (N. Y.), 13 N. E. 632; Dickon v.
Hays (Pa.), 7 Atl. 58; O'Dell v. Rogers (Wis.), 30 N. W. 229;
Boyd v. Blankman, 29 Cal. 19 (1865); Wear v. Skinner, 46
Md. 257 (1873); Commissioners v. Slnit, 22 Minn. 97, (1875);
Cock v. Van Etten, 12 Minn. 522; Parker v. Kuhn, 21 Neb.
413 (1887); MVarboztrg v. MlcCormick, 23 Kan. 24 (1879);
Walker v. Soule, 138 Mass. 51o (1885).
"Vhere the matter is regulated by enactment, providing
that the statute shall run in actions for relief against fraud,
etc., only from the date of discovery, actions not based on
fraud are held not to come within the saving: Howk v. .innick,
19 0. St. 462 (1869); District of Boomer v. French, 40 Ia. 6ol
(1875); Gall v. McDanie, 72 Cal. 334 (1887).
In Quimby v. Blackey, 63 N. H. 77 (1884), the court said:
"The fraud by which a cause of action is concealed need
not be other than that which caused the original injury, in
order to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations.
"The defendants' neglect to give information to the plaintiff
-ofthe finding of his money, and to restore it to him, knowing
it was his, was a fraud. By their silence and inaction afterward, 'the original fraud was kept on foot.' Their wilful
silence was a fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's cause of
action, and constitutes a sufficient answer to the plea of the
statute."
Mr. Justice MILLER, in the leading case of Bailey v. Glover,
21 Wall. 342 (1874), said: "The' appellant relies upon a
proposition which has been very often applied by the courts
.under proper circumstances in mitigation of the strict letter of
general statutes of limitations, namely, that when the object of
the suit is to obtain relief against a fraud, the bar of the
statute does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered
or becomes known to the party injured by it.
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This proposition has been incorporated in different forms
in the statutes of many of the states, and presented to the
courts under several aspects where there were no such
statutes. And while there is unanimity in regard to some of
these aspects there is not in regard to others.
In suits in equity where relief is sought on the ground of
fraud, the authorities are without conflict in support of the
doctrine that, where the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by affirmative acts of the guilty party in concealing the
facts from the other, the statute will not bar relief providecl.
suit is brought within proper time after the discovery of the
fraud. We also think that in suits in equity the decided.
weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that where.*
the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the
bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts
on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it
from the knowledge of the other party."
A long list of authorities may be cited: Booth v. Lord Wfar- .
r'ngton, 4 Bro. Parl. Cas. 163 ; South Sea Co. v. Wymondsell,,
3 P. Wms. 143; Hovenden v. Lord Annesly, 2 Sch. & Lefroy,
634; Stearnes v. Page, 7 How. 819; Moore v. Greene, 19..
How. 69; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mass. 143; Snodgrass v.
Bank, 25 Ala. 161; Bowman v. Sanborn, i N. H. 205;
Way v. C6uting, 2o N. H. 187; Weary. Skinner, 46 Md. 257;

Short v. McCarthy, 5 E. C. L. R. 403 ; Brown v. Howard, 6
E. C. L. R. 43 ; Granger v. George, i i E. C. L. R. 4o6 ;
Miehoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503 (1846); Veazie v. Williams,.
8 How. 134 ; Meader v. Norton, i I Wall. 442 (1870) ; Brown
v. Biuena Vista, 95 U. S. 157; Rosenthal v. WIValker, iii U. S.
185; Traerv. Clews, 115 U. S. 528 (1895); Kirbyv. Lake
Shore, &c.,R. R. Co., 120 U. S. 130 (1886); Ferrisv. Henderson, 12 Pa. 49 (I849); Payne v. Hathaway, 3 Vt. 212;
O'Dell v.Burnhain (Wisc.), 21 N. "W. 635 ; Bradford v.Mc-

Cormick (Ia.), 32 N. W. 93; HcAlpine v. Hedges, 21 Fed..
689; Carr v.Hilton, i Curtis C. C. 238; Vane v. Vane, L. R.
8 Ch. 383 ; Rolfe v.Gregory, 4 De G. J. & S.576; Bucknerv.
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Calcote, 28 Miss. 568 ; Lewis v. Wyelch, 48 N. W. 6o8 (Minn.
i89I); Manatt v. Starr, 72 Ia. 677 (1887); District of
Boomer v. Fiench, 48 Ia. 6ol ; Wilder v. Leser, 72 Ia. 161
(1887); and many others that.might be cited.
It would seem, however, that even in equity, "The concealment which will avoid the statute must go beyond mere
silence. It must be something done to prevent discovery . . some trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and
prevent inquiry: " Woody. Carpenter, IOI U. S. 185 (1879);
Boyd v. Boyd, 27 Ind. 429; Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind. 445 ;'
Sreves v. Leonard (Ia.), 8 N. W. 749; Stewart v. McBurney
(Pa.), i Atl. 639; Jackson v. Buchanan, 59 Ind. 370; Picher
v. Flinn, 30 Ind. 202.
Mere constructive fraud is not enough: Farnam v. Brooks,.
9 Pick. 212 (1830); Wilmerding v. Russ. 33 Conn. 67 (1865),
where an administrator sold stocks of the estate to himself,
crediting the estate with their market value, and transferring
them to a friend to hold for him, and it was held that, the
circumstances not showing actual fraud, the statute ran from.
the date of the sale.
Silence or failure to notify the other party of the existence
of a cause of action does not amount to a fraudulent concealment, the means of discovery being available to both parties,
and the defendant not having such peculiar facilities for
knowledge as to cause him to stand in a fiduciary relation:
Shreves v. Leonard (Ia.), 8 N. W. 749; Stewart v. McBurney
(Pa.), I Atl. 639; Wynne v. Cornelison, 52 Ind. 312; Warev.
State, 74 Ind. I8I ; Churchman v. Indianapolis, i ro Ind. 259.
In a case where a debtor disclosed to the personal representatives of his creditor the fact of his indebtedness, his
omission to state its amount was held not to be such fraudulent concealment as would toll the statute: Sankey v. McElevy, 1O4 Pa. 265 (1883).
In some jurisdictions it is held that ignorance of the causeof action is of no avail to avoid the statute, unless there be,
proof either of actual fraudulent concealment, or of something
in the nature of the cause of action which would tend to make
it conceal itself.
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An averment of" no knowledge or means of knowledge" has
been held insufficient: Phelps v. Elliot, 29 Fed. 53 (1886);
Dee v. Hyland (Utah), 3 Pac. 388.
Furthermore," a party seekingto avoid the bar of the statute on
account of fraud must aver and show that he used due diligence
to detect it, and if he had the means of discovery in his power,
he will be held to have known it." . . . The circumstances of

the discovery must be fully stated and proved, and the delay
which has occured must be shown to be consistent with the
requisite diligence:"
Wood v. Carpenter, iol U. S. 185
(1879); Buckner v. Calcote, 28 Miss. 432; Nudd v. Hamblin,
8 Atl. 130 ; Cole v. .ilcGlathry,9 Me. 131 ; 2fcKown v. Whitinan, 31 Me. 448; Rouse v. Southard, 39 Me. 404; Ormsby
v. Long worth, i i Ohio St. 653; Ainsfield v. 11ore, 46 N. W.
828 (Neb. 189o ) ; Wilton v. Merrick Co. (Neb.), 20 N. W.
i i ; Pearce v. Curran (R. I.), 3 Atd. 419; Cummings v.
Bannon (Md.), 8 Atl. 357; Vigus v. O'Bannon (111.), 8 N. E.
778 ; 1Hrphy v. Reedy (Miss.), 2 So. 167 ; Mathias v. O'Neil
Mo.), 6 S. W. 253; Board v. Vincent (Mich.), 33 N. W. 44;
McAlpin v. Hedges, 21 Fed. 689; Simmons v. Bayn&rd, 30
Fed. 532; Laird v. Kilbourne (Ia.), 3o N. W. 9; Perry v.
Smith (Kan.), 2 Pac. 784; King v. HcKellar (N. Y.), I6 N. E.
201 ; Hughes v. Bank (Pa.), i At. 417; Chetham v. Hoare,
L. R. 9 Eq. Cas. 571 (870); Norris v. Haggin, 28 Fed. 275
(1886).
"In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud, where the
statute of limitations has created a bar, the cause of action is
not considered as having accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud complained

of; but this does not absolve him from all effort or diligence
to obtain such knowledge; and facts of which he might have

obtained knowledge had he sought it from its natural sources
of information, which were at his command, will be deemed
within his knowledge: " Taylor v. S. & N. Alabama R. Co.,.
13 Fed. 152 (1882).
In equitable actions seeking relief against the consequences

of a mistake, the statute runs from the time when the mistake
is or should have been discovered: Gould v. Emerson, 16o
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Mass. 438 (894);
.tanatt v. Starr, 72 Ia. 677 (1887);
Hunter v. Spottswood, I Wash. 145 ; Massie v. Haskill, 8o
Va. 789 (1885); Cranmer v. IVcSword, 24 W. Va. 594;
(1884).

"While it is true that mistakes of law when standing alone,
cannot usually furnish a ground for equitable relief, yet where
one has the right to and does rely upon another, who omits
to state a most material legal consideration within his knowledge and affecting the other's rights, but of which the other is
ignorant, and acts under this misplaced confidence, and is
misled by it, a court of equity will afford relief, especially if
such action inures to the advantage of the person whose advice
is taken, even though no fraud was intended: Tompkins v.
Hollister,6o Mich. 470 (1886).
The cases dealing with the question in equity may be
classified according to their opposite conceptions as to the
binding force of the statute in courts of chancery. The
great majority of the authorities hold that the statute is
followed only by analogy, and as expressing in a convenient
form an equitable doctrine: Humbert v. Trinity ChurCh, 24
Wend. 587 (i84O), and cases cited; York v. Bright, 4
Humph. (Tenn.) 312 (1843); Norris v. Haggin, 28 Fed.
275, 277; Brooksbank v. Smith, 2 Y. & C. 58 (1836);
ALDERSON, B.
But, it has been held in Massachusetts, on the one hand,
that "the statute operates as a bar in equity of its own force
and not by the discretion of the court: Farnam v. Brooks, 9
Pick. 212 (1830); and, on the other hand, in West Virginia,
that "in a suit in equity to enforce a purely equitable demand,
the defence of the statute can have no application of itself
or by analogy to any limitation in courts of law. -Such
cases must be determined by courts of equity upon rules and
principles of their own: " Cranner v. McSwords, 24 W. Va.
594 (1884).
As to the application of the foregoing rules in actions at
law, there is an irreconcilable conflict of authority in America.
In Bailey v. Glover (szpra), MILLER, J., said: " Many of
the courts hold that the rule is sustained in courts of equity,
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only on the ground that those courts are not bound by the
mere force of the statute as courts of common law are, but
only as they have adopted its principle as expressing their
own rule of applying the doctrine of laches in analogous cases.
They, therefore, make concealed fraud an exception on purely
equitable principles: Troup v. Smithl, 20 Johns. 33 ; Callis
v. Waddy, 2 Munf. 511 ; M7iles v. Barry, I Hill (S. Car.), 296;
York v. Brght, 4 Humph. 312.
On the other hand, the English courts and the courts of
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and others of great
-respectability, hold that the doctrine is equally applicable to
.cases at law: Bree v. Holbeclk, Douglas, 655; Clarke v.
-fougham,3 Dowl. & Ryl. 322; Granger v. George, 5 B. &
C. 149 ; Turnpike Co. v. Field, 3 Mass. 20 1; Welles v. Fish,
.3 Pick. 75; Jones v. Caraway, 4 Yeates, 1o9; Rush v. Barr,
I Watts, I Io; Pennock v. Freeman, I Watts, 4oI ; Mitchell v.
Thompson, I McL. 9; Carrv. Hilon, I Curtis, 230.
"We are of opinion, that the weight of authority, both in
this country and in England, is in favor of the application of
the rule to suits at law as well as in equity. And we are also
of opinion that this is founded on a sound and philosophical
-view of the principles of the statutes of limitation. They were
enacted to prevent frauds; to prevent parties from asserting
"rights after the lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the
evidence which would show that such rights never existed, or
had been satisfied, transferred or extinguished, if they ever did
exist. To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing
a fraud in a manner that it conceals itself until such time as
the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to
prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and
secure. And we see no reason why this principle should not
be as applicable to suits tried on the common law side of the
court's calendar as to those on the equity side."
It must be remembered that this case was in equity, and
was decided under a statute of limitations which applied by
.its own language, to courts of equity as well as those of law;
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:and the court premised: "If there be an exception to the
universality of its language, it must be one which applies
under the same state of facts to suits at law as well as to suits
in equity."
The following additional cases apply the rule in common
law actions: Afitchellv.Buffington, io W. N. C. 361 (1881);
MfeDonnell v. Potter, 8 Pa. 189 (1848); Jones v. Conway, 4
Yeates, 1O9 (I8o4); Ferrs v. Henderson, 12 Pa. 49 (1849);
-Pennock v. Freeman, I Watts, 401 (1833) ; Glenn v. Lightner's
E&r., 40 Pa. 199 (1861); Morgan v. Tener, 83 Pa. 306 (I877);
,Wickersham v. Lee, 83 Pa. 416 (1877); First Mass. Turnpike
v. Field, 3 Mass. 201 (1807); Welles v. Field, 3 Pick. 74;
Rush v. Barr, I Watts, i1O (1832, 1825); Hughes v. Bank,
.I10 Pa. 428 (1883).
The fraudulent concealment pleaded in suspension of the
-statute need not be proved, in civil actions, beyond reasonable
-doubt: Ossipee v. Grant, 59 N. H. 70 (1879).
Where the aggrieved party was ignorant that the defendant
had any connection with the transaction, it is not necessary,
in order to arrest the bar of the statute, to prove diligent
efforts to fasten the fraud on such defendant: Clews v. Traer,
57 Ia. 459 (88i).
The other side of the controversy is epitomized in Troup v.
Smith, 20 Johns. 33. This was assumpsit for negligence, want
of skill, and fraud in making a survey, the land being so covered
with trees that the plaintiff did not discover the defects in the
.survey until after the statutory period had elapsed. SPENCER,
C. J.; said:
" There is a marked and manifest distinction between a plea
of the statute of limitations in a court of law and in a court
of equity. The best and fullest view of the effect in a court
of equity is given by Lord Redesdale, in 2 Sch. & Lef. p. 634.
iHe says, that although the statute does not, in terms, apply
to suits in equity, it has been adopted there as a rule prescribed by the legislature; and the reason he gives, why, if
the fraud has been concealed by the one party, until it has
been discovered by the other, within six years before the
,commencement of his suit, it shall not operate as a bar, is this;

472

THE OPERATION OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS, ETC..

that the statute ought not, in conscience to run, the conscienceof the party being so affected that he ought not to be allowed
to avail himself of the length of time. This is very intelligible and sound doctrine in a court of equity; and is, I appre-hend. the true and only tenable ground to deprive a defend-ant of the benefit of the plea. Courts of equity not being
bound by the statute any further than they have seen fit to
adopt its provisions as a reasonable rule, and then only in
analogy to the general doctrine of that court, are perfectlyright in saying that a party cannot, in good conscience, avail
himself of the statute when, by his own fraud, he has prevented
the other party from coming to a knowledge of his rights,
until within six years prior to the commencement of thesuit. But courts of law are expressly bound by the statute;
it relates to specified actions ; and it declares that such actions
shall be commenced and sued within six years next after thecause of such actions accrued, and not after; thus not only
affirmatively declaring within what time these actions are to bebrought, but inhibiting their being brought after that period..
I'know of no dispensing power which courts of law possess.
and arising from any cause whatever; and it seems to me that
where the legislation in the same statute gives an extension of'
time [in certain casesj -that it would be an assumption of legislative authority to introduce any other proviso.' "
In Campbell v. Vining, 23 Ill. 525 (186a), the court said r

"The courts in Massachusetts, Georgia and Pennsylvania hold
the doctrine, that as against a right of action dependent on theexistence of a secret fraud, the statute of limitations runs only'
from the period of the discovery of the fraud. In all those
cases, the courts bend the statute of limitations to include
cases not within its operation, as those states have no chancery
courts. They all refer to the dictum of Lord Mansfield in!
Bree v. folbeck. . . It is very clear, this eminent judge does
not lay down the general doctrine that fraud may, in all cases,.
be applied to a plea of the statute, as the courts before referred
to have done, and on the strength of his dictum. He merelysays: "There may be cases," without specifying them. See
Short v. McCarthy, 5 E. C. L. R. 403; Brown v. Howard, 6.
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E. C. L. R. 43; Grangerv.George, I I E. C. L. R. 406; Leonard
v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 31 ; Allen v. lille, 17 Wend. 202; Snitk
v. Bishop, 9 Vt. I16 ; Collis v. Waddy, 2 Munf. 511 ; Hamilton
v. Shepperd, 3 Murph. II5; Thompson v. Blair, Ibid. 583;
_Miles v. Barry, I Hill (S. C.), 191; Pyle v. Beck-with, I J. J.
Marshall, 445 ; Ellis v. Keso, 16 B. Mon. 296 (857).
In Freeholders of Somerset v. Veghte, 44 N. J. L. 509
(1882), it was held that courts cannot engraft on the statute
exceptions not contained therein, however inequitable the enforcement of the statute without such exceptions, may be.
The fraudulent concealment of a cause of action does not
justify the inference of a new promise which will check the
operation of the statute at law. MAGIE J., after a review of
-of the authorities, concluded that there was no well considered
English case upholding the rule contended for, and that the
American cases on that side were explainable by peculiarities
of the cases, or by the fact that in the states where they were
decided there were no separate courts of chancery.
Where there is no proof either of fraud, or of the absence of
reasonable means of discovery, mere ignorance of the cause of
action is still less a bar to the running of the statute at law
than in equity; and here, as there, means of knowledge equals
knowledge.
In Nruddv. Haviblin, 8 Atl. 130 (1864), it was held that
the omission to disclose a trespass upon real estate to the
-owner, if there is no fiduciary relation between the parties,
.and the owner has the means of discovering the facts, and
nothing has been done to prevent his discovery, is not such
a fraudulent concealment as will prevent the operation of
the statute; the court saying: "The plaintiff had the means
of ascertaining the cause of action by the exercise cf ordinary vigilance, and as defendant took no pains to conceal
his acts, either while he was committing the trespasses or at
any time afterwards, his -mere neglect to go to the plaintiff and
give her information of what he had done, is not such concealment on his part as the statute contemplates."
See, also, Fosterv. Rison, 17 Gratt. 32 1; Campbell v. Long,
2o Ia. 382; Bassand v. White, 9 Rich. Eq. (S. C.), 483;
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Bank v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324; Abell v. Harris.I I G. & J.
(Md.) 361; MAartin v. Bank, 31 Ala. I 15; Davis v. Cotton,
2 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 430; Flemming v. Colbert, 46 Pa. 498,
Moore v. Juvenal, 92 Pa. 484 (188o); McDowell v. Potter, &
Pa. 189 (1848); Owen v. Western Saving Fund, 97 Pa. 47;
Camobells Admr. v. Boggs, 48 Pa. 524 (1865); Steele's Admr.
v. Steele, 25 Pa. 154 (1855); Jordan v.Jordan, 4 Greenl. 175;
Thomas v. White, 3 Litt. 177; Fraley v. Jones, 52 Mo. 64;
Wells v. Halpin, 59 Mo. 92; Gebhard v. Sattler, 40 Ia. 153;

Brown v. Brown, 44 Ia. 349; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Dankwardt,
47 Ia. 432; Higgins v. Mendenhall, 5' Ia., 135; Heclit v.
Slaney, I4 Pac. 88 (Cal. 1887); fMurplzy v. Reedy, 21 So. 167
(Miss. 1887); Cotton v. Brown, 4 S. W. 294 (Ky. 1887);
Brown v. Houdlette, io Me. 339; Pearce v. Curran, I5
R. I. 298 (1 886) ; Cockrell's Exr. v. Cockrell, 15 S. W. I I 19
(Ky. 1891); Perry v. -Elgin.26 S. W. 4 (Ky. 1894); Moore
v. Boyd, 74 Cal. 167 (1887); Cooper v. Lee, 21 S. W. 998
(Tex. 1892); Purdon v. Seligman, 43 N. W. 1045 (Mich.

1889); Bishop v. Little, 3 Me. 405; Fitschler v. Kaehler, 83
Ky. 78 (1885); Commissioners v. Smith, 22 Minn. 9 7; Conner
v" Goodman, 104 Ill. 365 ; Adams v. Ipswich, 116 Mass. 570;
M1rastv. Easton, 33 Minn. I61 (1885); Buckle v. Chrisman's
Admrs. 76 Va. 678- (i88z); Furlong v. Stone, 12 R. 1. 437
(1879); Smitht v. Bishop, 9 Vt. i xo; Schultz v. Board, 95
Ind. 323 ; Binzney v. Brown, 116 Pa. 169.

In some instances it has been held that, although means of
discovery were open, the circumstances were such as to justify
the plaintiff in failing to employ such means. See fitclell v.
Buffington, io W. N. C. 361 (1881) ; Falley v. Gribling-, 26
N. E. 794 (Ind. 1891); Schererv. Ingerman, no Md. 428;

Bradford v. McCormick, 71 Ia. 129 (1887).
A mere suspicion of wrong is not tantamount to a discovery
of the fraud so as to start the running of the statute: farbourg v. McCormick, 23 Kan. 24 (1879).
S. D. M.

